No country has done more than the United States to help Pakistan achieve a peaceful political transition. Naturally, goodwill between the two countries should be stronger. But a shadow hovers over bilateral cooperation due to emerging difference over the conduct of the war on terror. While the new Pakistan government appears determined to initiate talks with local
Taliban in order to bring an end to internal insurgency Washington is predictably apprehensive the resultant relaxation in pressure on terrorists would enable Al Qaeda to intensify preparations for attacks on American targets. There is no indication yet that Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani statement of March 29 declaring ‘war on terror is our own war’ has diminished Washington’s concerns. US unease is bound to mount as a result of NWFP Assembly’s resolution of April 1 condemning CIA Director Michael Haden for threatening to bomb terrorists abusing Pakistan territory as sanctuary. Surely Pakistan does not intend to tolerate such abuse. Both sides need therefore to discuss the matter in the context of strategy as well as tactics in order to prevent damage to mutual cooperation.
It is increasingly evident that the so far parallel aims of Islamabad and Washington in the war on terror are beginning to diverge. While the United States remains focused on liquidation of Al Qaeda’s mortal threat Pakistan is primarily concerned about mounting loss of life due to terrorist bombings and suicide attacks over the past two years. People not only in tribal areas and Frontier Province but across the country desperately want an end to their suffering which they attribute to Islamabad’s flawed policy of fighting what they dub as America’s war. The new government does not share this mistaken perception but it cannot ignore the popular outcry. It has decided to discuss policy in the parliament. Dialogue with militants is on the cards. Awami National Party has already initiated contacts with ‘local Taliban’ believing that insurgency is a political issue and it can be defused through negotiations.
Local Taliban are no doubt a problem Pakistan needs to address but in doing so it cannot allow relaxation of the war on international terrorism which is the main concern of the United States. Both aims have to be pursued simultaneously. The alliance would become untenable if one side seeks to promote its own objectives at the expense of the other. Pakistan cannot evade its obligation under international law to prevent abuse of its territory by Al Qaeda terrorists and Afghan Taliban. The Taliban regime had to pay a high price for allowing Al Qaeda to establish a base for international terrorism on Afghan soil.
Cognizant of its obligation, Pakistan tried to prevent entry of Al Qaeda and Taliban fleeing Afghanistan after 9/11. Our armed forces engaged them and intercepted, arrested or killed hundreds of intruders. Scores of notorious ones were handed over to US authorities, extradited or deported. But others managed to carve out a sanctuary in the cavernous mountainous terrain of the autonomous tribal areas which were familiar to Al Qaeda since the Afghan liberation struggle and where local inhabitants were sympathetic and even reverential to Arab jihadis. The fight against outlaws has entailed high costs in lives for Pakistani forces but they have continued efforts to locate and eliminate foreign terrorists. If too many have eluded pursuit it is often because of protection by local militants motivated by ideological affinity, tribal tradition of hospitality to asylum-seekers or crass considerations.
The task of clearing Pakistan territory of foreign terrorists has become interminable because Al Qaeda’s advocacy of struggle has drawn new recruits from Central Asian and other foreign countries as well as Taliban from within Pakistan. Their ranks have grown because antagonism and hatred have been fuelled by multiple grievances. A credible impression prevails of US indifference if not hostility to legitimate causes of Muslim peoples and spread of Islamophobia, social and economic discrimination, selective targeting of Muslims residents and visitors for harassment and dissemination of blasphemous anti-Islam propaganda in the West. Also relatives and friends of innocent victims of so-called collateral damage join militants to take revenge. Rectification of grievances would be a complex exercise even if there was an appreciation of the causes and political will on part of the United States and other Western countries of which unfortunately there is no sign.
Such a difficult popular and political environment in Pakistan is obviously not conducive for an objective reappraisal of policy by the democratic government. Yet it has to make the effort patiently and carefully so as to prevent damage to Pakistan-US cooperation which is vital for Pakistan no less than for the United States. The key to a solution lies in making a distinction between Al Qaeda with an international agenda, Afghan Taliban whose primary aim is power in Afghanistan and Pakistani Taliban and tribal militants who are motivated largely by their opposition to Pakistan’s alliance with the United States and its deleterious consequences for their internal aims.
A comprehensive strategy should make it emphatically clear that Pakistan’s attempt to wean back the Pakistani Taliban and militants would not relax military operations aimed at expulsion of Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban from Pakistan territory. Washington on its part can and should help Pakistani initiative by relying on Pakistani forces for action against Al Qaeda encampments in Pakistan and by joining Pakistan to provide compensation to families of victims of collateral damage.
Meanwhile there should be no doubt in Washington about the goodwill of the leadership of Pakistan People’s Party towards the United States. It cannot ignore the indispensable contribution Washington made towards persuading President Pervez Musharraf to take off uniform, withdraw emergency and hold fair, free and transparent elections. Even more important was the National Reconciliation Ordinance that President Musharraf proclaimed as part of the deal with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Without this unprecedented concession granting indemnity from criminal cases pending in courts involving alleged violations of laws prior to October 1999, the struggle for revival of democracy would have been more protracted and probably also sanguinary.
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