MORE curious than the evident difference between Islamabad and Washington on peace negotiations with Taliban is the commendable restraint and reason manifest in their statements on this inherently critical issue. The explanation and the rationale of their cautious statements is probably to be found in two fundamental factors.
While the United States and NATO have resources necessary to fight war on terror abroad and simultaneously ensure homeland security, they both know Pakistan does not. Secondly, the United States has tended to equate Taliban with Al Qaeda while Pakistan perceives a clear distinction between the two. Al Qaeda has an international agenda but Taliban’s aims are domestic, in Afghanistan as in Pakistan.
Some of the US allies in Afghanistan have already recognized this difference and advocated negotiations with the Afghan Taliban even before the new government in Pakistan embarked on a parallel course with Pakistani Taliban.
If Washington has been slow to perceive the distinction it is because of its understandable preoccupation with Al Qaeda which explains also its belief that any future terrorist attack on the United States would be planned and organized from Pakistan’s tribal territory where Al Qaeda is alleged to have regrouped even though the premise has begun to seem increasingly dubious.
The fact is Al Qaeda is no longer what it was before the US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. The terrorist organization suffered heavy casualties due to US bombing and was then obliged to shift and establish a base in the tribal territory which Pakistan opposed with all the might it could muster.
Caught in a nutcracker between US forces on one side and Pakistan army on the other the terrorist organisation lost hundreds of high ranking cadres. Most of those escapees who initially found refuge with sympathizers in tribal territory were in course time liquidated, arrested or expelled.
Al Qaeda was all but crushed. In the past couple of years little has been heard or seen connecting Al Qaeda with armed clashes or acts of terror in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Afghan Taliban, not Al Qaeda, have fought American, NATO and Afghan forces and similarly Pakistani Taliban, not Al Qaeda, have perpetrated suicide and terrorist bombings in Paksitan.
As for Al Qaeda instigation of violence in Iraq US allegations have lacked credibility because everyone is aware of the indigenous dynamics of sectarian rivalry in that unfortunate country. Al Qaeda activity has been so conspicuous by its absence that it seems reasonable to conclude its back has been broken. It is time therefore to deal with new realities.
Correctly diagnosing the transformation, the new government in NWFP decided to embark on a policy of peace negotiations with the Taliban and expeditiously concluded an agreements with the Taliban in Swat. The accord signed on May 21 merits close attention by those who apprehend adverse consequences.
Basically the Taliban have agreed to hand over all foreign militants and dismantle training centres for terrorists and suicide bombers. Also they have pledged to refrain from attacks on government offices, police stations, army personnel, bridges and roads and girls schools.
In exchange the government has conceded reasonable demands which focus on reform of notoriously inefficient and corrupt governance. People of Swat were used to simple, low-cost and paternalistic rule when the state was under the Wali. In contrast, the administration extended to the state after its accession to Pakistan has proved insensitive, inefficient, venal and exploitative.
No wonder the Taliban demanded action against bribe-takers, adulterers, thieves and dacoits. The same is the logic for return to Sharia law. The judicial system under the Wali was fair and speedy. In contrast the Paksitani system - a legacy of British colonialism - now applicable in the Swat has entailed regression in the name of modernization. Not in a position to defend state’s performance since independence government negotiators wisely conceded Taliban demands for reform.
The above is not to say the NWFP government or people support the Taliban’s antiquated political agenda. Pakistan’s founding fathers envisioned an enlightened, modern and moderate Islamic state with equal rights for citizens free of discrimination on basis of race, religion or social status.
People expect the state to discover and implement policies aimed at realization of the dream. It is because government in Pakistan has failed to deliver on the promise that poor and powerless people have turned to other, at times medieval practices. Savage killing of three dacoits by a crowd in Karachi the other day was attributable in part to popular frustration at the dismal record of police in apprehending and prosecuting criminals and endless delays that amount to denial of justice.
Mushroom rise of extremism and militancy is similarly due to failure of state to provide broad and contemporary education facilities for all children. As a result too many of the poor are trapped by schools with narrow curriculum and agendas that promote extremism and militancy.
The agreement with the Swat Taliban represents a good model and hopefully it will be implemented in letter and spirit. If so, it may help overcome the memory of Pakistan’s 2005 agreement with Taliban in the Tribal territory which was counter-productive.
The tribal Taliban not only did not honour their commitment to expel foreign terrorists and refrain from attacks against Pakistan but also exploited the ceasefire by Pakistani forces to strengthen their organization, resume training and increase cross-border attacks on US, NATO and Afghan forces.
If another agreement were to be signed by Pakistan with the Taliban in Waziristan the probability of repetition cannot be discounted. Taliban Commander Baitulla Mehsud was quoted to have declared at a press conference at Kotkai in South Waziristan on May 24 that while he favoured an agreement with Pakistan because the conflict between Taliban and Pakistan government was ‘harming Islam and Pakistan’ his forces would ‘continue the jihad against the US and its allies in Afghanistan’ because ‘Islam does not recognize any man-made boundaries.’
Clearly such an agreement should be unacceptable to Pakistan because it would violate recognized principles of international law. Every state has an obligation to prevent persons on its territory from organizing attacks on another state. NWFP Governor Owais Ghani surely did not mean to disavow the international obligation when he was quoted to have told US Operation Command chief Admiralk Eric Olson, ‘Pakistan will take care of its own problems, you take care of Afghanistan on your side.’ Giving Pakistan the benefit of doubt, US Secretary of State said on May 24 she did not believed Pakistan wanted to exacerbate the situation in the tribal areas or create problems for Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, mature diplomacy by Islamabad and Washington has prevented a crisis over Pakistan’s strategic switch from exclusively military to peaceful means for relief from Taliban terrorism. The United States entertains grave reservations on Pakistan’s decision to enter into agreements with the Taliban but it has not pushed or pressured Islamabad to abandon its new policy of negotiations for peace in order to save the country from carnage and destruction it has suffered as a result of terrorist attacks. Islamabad on its part is by no means dismissive of apprehensions of United States, NATO and Afghanistan that Pakistan’s attempt to solve its problem could aggravate the problem in Afghanistan as Taliban could now organize, equip and train in Pakistan territory for operations in Afghanistan.
‘The government has declared it ‘will continue the war on terror’ and assured friends and allies it remains committed to preventing abuse of Pakistan territory for cross-border operations. Of course the underlying contradiction cannot be resolved by promises. While Washington appears willing to wait its bottom line is ‘results.
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